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Introduction  
The insecurity on the Korean Peninsula comes from the competition of the South/North political 
system arising from the division of the Korean peninsula. But the root of the region's security 
crisis originated with Japan’s occupation before and during World War II, though a more 
immediate cause comes from U.S. policy after the war. At that time, the United States selected 
the 38th degree parallel on the Korean peninsula as the line at which to block the Soviet Union’s 
march to the south to intervene in Japanese affairs. This line hardened through the Korean War, 
and turned the border into an Iron Curtain between the South and the North. 
Since the mid-1970s, the North’s national power has declined compared to the South’s—leading 
Pyongyang to consider nuclear weaponry to compensate for the military imbalance. Today, the 
North Koreans have to use this as a political card during diplomatic negotiations in order to 
sustain the North Korean political system.  
President George W. Bush’s second term started on January 20, 2005; and soon after, President 
Bush nominated National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice as his new Secretary of State to 
replace Colin L. Powell. Powell is known as a moderate who values to international cooperation: 
For example, his most triumphant moment came in November 2002, with the unanimous approval 
of a resolution by the U.N. Security Council demanding that Iraq comply with weapons 
inspections, or face the prospect of war.[1] On the other hand, Rice is known as a principled 
policy advocate. She evaluated the U.S.-North Korea Agreement as “failed,” and strongly 
persisted in the importance of the Six Party Talks. And, she gave warning to North Korea: “I don’t 
think we can speculate where an interdiction initiative should lead—but I do think it’s extremely 
important that countries like North Korea recognize that if they’re going to flaunt their international 
obligations there will be a price for that—there will be a cost for that.”[2] 
In this essay, I would like to suggest ways the Bush administration can improve its foreign policy 
toward the Korean Peninsula in its second term. I would like to evaluate the perceptions of the 
South Koreans, the North Koreans and the U.S. toward each other. To understand these 
perceptions there is an old proverb: “Jipi jiki baekjeon bultoai (First know the enemy, before you 
fight; then you will win every time). ” 
Assessing Korea-U.S. Relations  
South Korean perceptions of the U.S. have been formed upon a base of good will and an 
excessively dependent mindset toward the U.S. It also perceives that its relative prosperity has 
been realized by introducing an American-style democracy along with a free market in South 
Korea. On the other hand, with more freedom, its demand for democracy and need for an identity 
grew stronger. There have been active student and social movements across the country 
demanding the establishment of a relationship on more equal terms between the ROK and the 
U.S. These movements are led by progressive politicians, scholars, and religious bodies whose 
views toward the U.S. forces in Korea (USFK) are especially negative. They are endeavoring to 
build a consensus on such issues as a revision of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), 
utilizing a traffic accident in which middle school girls were killed by a U.S. armored vehicle as 
well as environmental concerns about the firing ranges used by USFK.  
A 2000 survey conducted by the Han-gyuhrae newspaper—on the question, “Do you think it is 
necessary for the U.S. forces to stay in the Korean peninsula at the present time?”—found that 
70.6 percent of respondents replied ‘Yes,’ and 26.85 percent replied ‘No.’ When the same survey 
was conducted in 2002, 57.7 percent answered ‘Yes,’ and 33.4 percent ‘No.’[3]  
A July 2004 survey found that 22 percent of congressmen in the National Assembly have 
backgrounds as student activists or progressive labor agitators. They claim the dispatch of ROK 
forces to Iraq is a mercenary action without a justification, opposed the North Korean Human 
Rights bill due to a possibility of more tension on the Korean peninsula, and generally maintain a 
negative point of view toward the role of the USFK.  
Regarding these current attitudes, the conservatives who were devoted to the industrialization of 
South Korea are reminding their people of the lessons learned from the Korean War by 
emphasizing the communist revolution of warlike North Korea and working to expand the anti-
nuclear/anti-Kim movement. In the midst of these divided politics, the biggest Protestant NGO, 
the Christian Social Responsibility Preparatory Committee, was established in November 2004 to 
“save the nation from the crisis in accordance with Christian conscience by leaving dichotomies of 
Left/Right, Progressive/Conservative and Pro-Rho/ Anti-Rho.” On the other hand, on the same 
day, the Free Democracy Solidarity group was organized mainly by young scholars who held a 
press conference to declare their duties to maintain the “Free Democracy and Stability,” demand 
North Korea pursue “Human Right improvement and democracy,” and develop an “ROK/U.S. 
alliance toward the 21st Century.”  
Based on these activities, there exists in South Korea a conservative pro-U.S. power group which 
appraises the USFK as an essential element to protect the current political structure, and 
therefore tries to enhance the alliance with the United States; a progressive radical anti-U.S. 
power group which asserts a justification from a nationalist point of view to exclude foreign 
interferences; and a new right wing group which values national interests first and foremost, in the 
form of more group cooperative internationalism with the United States.  
North Korean perceptions of the United States are easily found out from the vast number of 
documents published by the North Korean government. For example, North Korea’s official 
publications and public media refers to the United States as a “sworn enemy” (chulchunji 
woeunsu), “core enemy” (jujuck) or “American Imperialist” (mi jeguck jueui). Some statements are 
propaganda, but they reflect the views of a tightly controlled state and are the only views the 
North Korean people are exposed to. They claim that it was the United States that blocked the 
way to national unification by communist revolution in the Korean War (referred to in the literature 
as the “National Unification War”), and it is still the United States that is blocking the way of 
reunification. They also claim that their current economic poverty is due to the United States’ 
hostility and economic containment.  
They assert that North Korea is the one true negotiator with the U.S. for reunification of the 
Korean Peninsula, because South Korea is the puppet government of the U.S., which they 
perceive to be occupying South Korea. Its pre-condition for negotiations has always been a 
withdrawal of USFK. The North Koreans propagandize that: 
The United States had to publish an apology when the Pueblo was captured in 1968; when an 
EC-121 was shot down in 1969, the United States had to give up its military retaliation; during the 
nuclear crisis between 1993 and 1994, the only measure the United States could do was to 
publish “N.K./U.S. Basic Agreement,” and the United States had to pay $0.3 billion for a tour fee 
inside the suspicious Kum-chang-ri Underground Facilities.[4]  
Even though all these examples are exaggerated and distorted in many aspects, the North 
Korean people perceive that the North Korean government plays the main role in the reunification 
process because they are only exposed to this interpretation.  
Such anti-U.S. sentiments are seen not only in the leadership, but seem to have spread among 
the North Korean people as well. The main reason why the North Korean government seeks to 
maintain anti-U.S. sentiment is to preserve and justify its own political system, declaring the U.S. 
as the class enemy of the people. A typical educational instrument for North Korean political 
socialization is the war museum named “Shin-chun (Grand Brutality),” which fosters a hostile 
feeling against United States. According to North Korean defectors, “after several visits at the 
museum, people couldn’t help realizing hostilities aroused against the United States in their 
mind.”[5]  
Questionnaires of North Korean defectors reveal that the countries they most detest are the 
United States, Japan and South Korea, in that order. Also, 90 percent of them believe USFK must 
depart from the peninsula “right away,” while only 7.5 percent prefer “phased withdrawals of 
troops.” Most alarmingly, a majority of them (64 percent) still believe a war would be a desirable 
solution for reunification.[6] Even though these results come only from the North Korean defectors 
whose status is rather exceptional, the data does suggest how the North Korean people perceive 
the United States, owing to the anti-U.S. sentiments generated by the North Korean government 
in an effort to rationalize its political slogan, “Second to None Korean Nation Policy,” and cover up 
their internal problems to the outside. The main reason why the North Korean government 
spreads anti-U.S. sentiments is to bind its system and secure its legitimacy. Therefore, there is a 
little hope of stopping North Korean hostility to the U.S. under the Kim Jung Il regime.  
U.S. perceptions of both Koreas have evolved throughout the long history of the United States on 
the Korean Peninsula. The U.S. first established official diplomatic relations with the Cho-sun 
Dynasty through the Shufeldt Treaty in May 1882. In 1908, the United States secured a foothold 
in the Philippines and, in turn, turned a blind eye to the Japanese occupation in Korea in the 
Root -Takahira Agreement. “The United States rather blatantly sold out Korea and complied with 
Japanese desires for a free hand in its backyard.”[7] And, in November 1943 at Cairo, the United 
States took part in the Cairo declaration, which stated “three great powers, mindful of the 
enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free 
and independent.”  
However, as mentioned in the introduction, the ultimate fate of Korea was determined by the U.S. 
counter-Soviet measures, which divided the Korean peninsula along the 38th parallel. Once again, 
Korea fell victim between the two great powers. Shortly after, upon entering the Cold War era, the 
Korean peninsula became a local battlefield where the U.S. containment policy against the Soviet 
Union, and the Soviet Union’s expansionism, collided with each other—creating an international 
“Hot War,” the Korean War. After the cease-fire in 1953, the United States gave South Korea full 
support to prove the superiority of its democracy and free market economy, and South Korea 
successfully fulfilled this purpose during the Cold War.  
In the post-Cold War era, during the Clinton and Bush administrations, U.S. foreign policies 
towards the Korean peninsula such as the “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” “Non-
proliferation of WMD,” and “Peace and Stability,” have coincided with U.S. national interests—but 
the United States did not always consult closely with South Korea on these policies.  
After 9/11, the United States has been pursuing active interventionist policies to defend its 
homeland, and its methods of pursuing its national interests are well observed in the Quadrennial 
Defense Review (QDR). The 2001 QDR stated, “If deterrence fails, decisively defeat any 
adversary. Such a decisive defeat could include changing the regime of an adversary state or 
occupation of foreign territory until the U.S. strategic objectives are met.”[8] Such a defense policy 
has not only articulated in that policy document, but was actually implemented in Afghanistan and 
Iraq. That North Korea has been categorized as part of the “Axis of Evil” along with Iraq has 
resulted in extreme tension.  
Bush's Second Term: Foreign Policy toward the Korean Peninsula  
It's quite likely that U.S. foreign policies during Bush’s second term will be more uncompromising, 
with its hardliners—such as Vice President Cheney, Secretary of State Rice, Undersecretary of 
State Bolton, and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld—in positions of influence. Neoconservative 
supporters of these hardliners who are out of public office are strongly critical of current South 
Korean policies towards its northern counterpart, and are calling for a change of regime in North 
Korea.  
Nicholas Eberstadt, senior researcher at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), claims that “the 
core group of the South Korean Roh Government has become uncompromisingly anti-U.S. and 
appeasing towards the North Korea.” He also argues “the U.S. must realize it is impossible to 
persuade the North Korean regime through dialogues or economic aid and should treat the 
nuclear issues the same as the North Korean regime itself to find a solution.”[9] And, Defense 
Secretary Rumsfeld stated in congressional testimony that “[t]he priorities for the Department of 
Defense in 2004, are for example: radicals using the existing WMD or example capabilities of 
unfriendly states and non-state actors, and stopping the spread WMD.”[10]  
A close look at the major players in the White House and their views suggests the political 
standpoint of the U.S. government toward the Korean peninsula remains committed to harder line 
policies. Whether the U.S. defense policies articulated in the 2001 QDR will be implemented or 
not depends on how the North Korean regime will react, and how this will affect the United States’ 
vital national interests such as homeland defense and non-proliferation of WMD.  
As for the consequences, the major issues on the Korean nuclear crisis are summarized as 
follows:  
1. There remain fundamental differences in perspective on security in this region. The 
American position is that they will never tolerate the possession of nuclear weapon by 
North Korea, which is becoming a great threat to world peace, especially after 9/11. North 
Korean possession of nuclear weapons is indeed a formidable threat to other countries, 
and moreover, it is feared that such weapons could be infiltrated into a terrorist group or a 
hostile member of the international community. On the other hand, North Korea insists 
that they have the right to have nuclear weapons for their national security, as they would 
more effectively deter a possible pre-emptive strike by the United States.  
2. There are three major differences in perspective on the issue of nuclear proliferation 
policy between South and North Korea. President Rho’s government is more generous 
about the potential nuclear armament of North Korea and wants to deal with North Korea 
in a sensitive way. President Rho intends to promote North-South relations by easing the 
North Koreans out of their economic crisis through the promotion bilateral trade and the 
normalization of U.S.-North Korean relations. John Feffner argues that “North Korea will 
not likely feel secure enough to relinquish its nuclear deterrence, if it forever remains an 
outlier, and normalization is an important step toward a future in which North Korea is 
unlikely to use whatever weapons of destruction it possesses.”[11] The South Korean 
government sees any economic support of the North Koreans a necessary cost of 
achieving Korean unification. Though North Korea accepts economic help from South 
Korea in order to cope with its current economic crisis, it will not tolerate anything it 
perceives as attempted interference in their national sovereignty.  
3. The third problem comes from difficulties in how to manage the nuclear crisis on both 
sides of peninsula, while they compete with a hegemonistic establishment for the 
unification of Korea while addressing processes to solve the nuclear armament problem. 
Since North Korea has come to understand that waging an accelerated arms race is a 
losing battle, it now seems to concentrate on nuclear armament, which may give it an 
asymmetric advantage and let North Korea achieve strategic supremacy with less cost. 
But North Korea criticizes the intensions of South Korea, suggesting it's exacerbating the 
nuclear issue as part of the US–North Korea conflict, hiding its intentions to acquire 
military supremacy through nuclear armament. Knowing these North Korean intentions 
would be a major obstacle to Korean unification, the South Korean government is trying 
to solve the crisis by establishing a nuclear free Korean peninsula. South Korea, which 
perceives that any instigation of the North could bring about unexpected military tension, 
insists that the problem of North Korea’s nuclear ambition should be solved in a peaceful 
way.  
Considering the varying perceptions discussed above, we are recommending an American 
foreign policy toward both Koreas with four distinct themes:  
1. Firstly, since the nuclear crisis is basically a problem within the Korean Nation, the 
Koreans must solve it. The United States should be a good faith mediator that can 
provide assistance toward a successful resolution.. Both South and North Korea should 
understand that possessing nuclear armaments could result in the destruction of both 
Koreas, and take part in a humble discussion and work toward a constructive solution 
that may resolve perceptual ambiguities on each side through the spirit of agreement 
between South and North.  
2. Secondly, the United States should provide full support to negotiations to solve the 
nuclear problem between South and North Korea, serving as a supervisor using six-party 
talks, and by supporting UN Security Council resolutions to send a strong message to 
North Korea that the US really wants to help solve the crisis. Zbigniew Brzezinski has 
observed “[t]he cost of sustaining development and keeping Nuclear weapons is high, but 
the reward of discarding the nuclear card will be much more than that.”[12] Also, the 
United States can present guidelines for solving the nuclear crisis with the option that the 
North could return to the NTP agreement and commit to a sincere responsibility.  
3. Thirdly, the tension and the relations between the United States and North Korea should 
be resolved and normalized by replacing the current truce agreement with a peace treaty 
including a mutual non-infiltration agreement through fundamental and basic 
understanding of problems on each side. These measures could provide North Korea 
with good cause to dismantle their nuclear program and also give South Korea legitimate 
partnership status for controlling Korean peninsular security problems. Then the US could 
escape from the various difficulties and high costs of enforcing the current armistice 
agreement between the US and North Korea. Once a final peace treaty is established, 
American forces in Korea can be redeployed as part of a new UN peacekeeping force, or 
other various types of military forces.  
4. Finally, the United States should provide appropriate assistance for the reunification of 
Korea, which could result in the realization of the Cairo Doctrine that the independence of 
Korea is owed to the Korean people. The United States will never be free of its 
responsibility for the division of Korea, and should thus positively affirm its responsibilities 
in international affairs, and have the flexibility to apply possible economic sanctions on 
North Korea, giving way to success through large-scale economic projects like the Gae-
Sung Industrial Complex.  
To Koreans, their country was divided without the consent of the people, resulting in the loss of 
numerous lives and the tremendous destruction of properties. In the midst of a dispute between 
great powers, Koreans have worked hard to improve their quality of life after enduring much pain 
during the Cold War period. One part of the nation, which has the wrong political system, needs 
international help; while the other part of the nation has achieved a basic quality of life, and is 
trying to enhance it.  
In recent years, South Koreans have collaborated to lay a corner stone for the reunification of 
Korea, restoring the integrity of the two Koreas and eliminating the prevailing distrust for each 
side, which is a great obstacle generated by fifty years of division of the Korean peninsula. The 
most important element of the various South and North exchanges and assistance programs is 
the development of economic cooperation, which could secure the basic quality of life for the 
North Korean people.  
During its first term, the Bush administration—while waging a global war against terrorism and 
implementing its pro-active nuclear non-proliferation policy—did not agree with the South Korean 
policy toward North Korea, where South Korea initiated South/North Korea cooperation and 
reconciliation. For their part, the Kim Dae-joong and Rho Moo-hyun administrations also did not 
provide their full consent to making a deal on nuclear policy, arguing that it would only instigate 
greater tension on the Korean peninsula. Regarding the cliffhanger policy of North Korea a 
terrorist attack against South Korea during the Cold War period, the U.S. government would not 
tolerate any more provocative and ruthless behavior by North Korea. So, a policy of flexible 
engagement between the ROK and the DPRK was certainly not warmly embraced by Washington 
as serving the best interests of either the ROK or the United States.[13] On the other hand, in 
evaluating the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars, North Korea is no doubt anxious about a preemptive 
attack by the United States, which has designated it as a member of the axis of evil.  
There is an old saying in Korea that “mighty uncle should be generous (himsen ahje ga 
chamahra),” which means the stronger party must endure and retreat in a dispute to accomplish a 
deal. Self-reliance and cooperation within the nation has recently, and more frequently, come to 
the surface in Korea—which has resulted in the South and North engaging in a unification 
process. They want the U.S. government to be a good coordinator of Korean unification, to 
facilitate the process toward unification—leaving the nuclear problem, which is a prospective 
major obstacle to the unification process, to both Koreas to solve as an internal problem of the 
nation. In the future, after unification is achieved with the assistance of the United States, the 
leaders of the united Korean nation-state will have the authority to handle all business relating to 
the Korean peninsula.  
The Bush administration must clearly understand that problems relating to North Korea cannot be 
solved by military means, and should assert openly that they will not use military measures to 
solve the North Korean nuclear crisis. If the United States, as a good faith mediator, offers 
broader assistance, it shall achieve much better results—and more easily way—with cooperation 
from both South and North Korea. 
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic Insights 
home page. 
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